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The Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter is a publication of the 
Maryland Health Care Ethics 
Committee Network, an initiative 
of the University of Maryland 
School of Law’s Law & Health 
Care Program. The Newsletter 
combines educational articles with 
timely information about bioethics 
activities. Each issue includes 
a feature article, a Calendar of 
upcoming events, and a case 
presentation and commentary by 
local experts in bioethics, law, 
medicine, nursing, or related 
disciplines. 
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As an ethicist for a four-hospital Catholic health system in Wis-consin, I do not believe we 
present any uniqueness concerning the 
complexity of issues addressed by our 
ethics committees. In some instances 
the referrals we receive for ethics con-
sultation are circumscribed by a general 
frustration or professional distress in the 
level of care (or lack thereof) requested 
by the patient or family in relationship to 
the patient’s clinical acuity. When such 
frustration or distress is identified as one 
concern among many related to the con-
flict that warranted ethics consultation, it 
is often termed “moral distress.” Given 
the prevalence of this term in the bioeth-
ics literature, it is my view that “moral 
distress,” as a concept, requires a reex-
amination in light of its original meaning 
offered by Andrew Jameton in 1984. 
Jameton implicitly crafted a definition 
of moral distress in his book NursiNg 
Practice: the ethical issues: “…moral 
distress arises when one knows the right 
thing to do, but institutional constraints 
make it nearly impossible to pursue the 
right course of action” (Jameton, 1984). 
It seems, however, that negative feelings 
associated with moral distress (i.e., anger, 
frustration, and the like) have been attrib-
uted to moral distress in cases where “the 
right thing to do” was still in question 
(Hanna, 2004). My assertion is that situ-
ations involving differing opinions about 
the best (i.e., “morally right”) course of 
action evoke discomfort among some 
members of the health care team, and 
MORAL DISTRESS— 
MISUNDERSTOOD, MISAPPLIED
that this discomfort is wrongly attributed 
to moral distress rather than to its actual 
cause—moral subjectivity. 
Nurses’ Perceptions of Moral Distress 
in End-of-life Decision-Making
Ellen Elpern identified situations 
resulting in high levels of “moral dis-
tress” among medical intensive care unit 
nurses. Nurses identified the following 
six contexts as causing the greatest levels 
of moral distress in both intensity and 
frequency (Elpern, 2005):
1. Continue to participate in care for 
hopelessly ill person who is being 
sustained on a ventilator, when no 
one will make a decision to “pull 
the plug;”
2. Follow a family’s wishes to contin-
ue life support even though it is not 
in the best interests of the patient;
3. Initiate extensive life-saving  
actions when I think it only  
prolongs death;
4. Follow the family’s wishes for the 
patient’s care when I do not agree 
with them but do so because the 
hospital administration fears a 
lawsuit;
5. Carry out the physician’s orders for 
unnecessary tests and treatments 
for terminally ill patients; and 
6. Provide care that does not relieve 
the patient’s suffering because the 
physician fears increasing doses of 
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The information in this newsletter
is not intended to provide legal advice
or opinion and should not be acted
upon without consulting an attorney.
nurses experienced moral distress in 
intensity and frequency more so than 
physicians—again reflecting the same 
theme of feeling compelled to provide 
aggressive treatments at the insistence 
of others (Delgado, et al., 2005). A 
conclusion of these three decades of 
work on moral distress seems modestly 
summarized by Elpern (2005), who 
noted: “Moral distress is a serious issue 
in the workplace and deserves urgent 
and extended attention.”
With a nod to Elpern’s request, I 
return to her research in 2005 on the 
frequency and intensity of the experi-
ence of moral distress to offer some 
analysis. In each of the six examples 
identified by ICU nurses as an experi-
ence of moral distress, there exists 
language (italicized in the examples 
above) that either necessitates defini-
tion or can only be defined in context. 
Terms like “hopeless,” “best interests,” 
“extensive,” “unnecessary” or “suffer-
ing” are subjective assessments that 
require context to flesh out precisely 
what they mean. A distinction should 
be made between a true inability of the 
The Maryland Healthcare Ethics Committee Network (MHECN) is a 
membership organization, established by the Law and Health Care Program 
at the University of Maryland School of Law. The purpose of MHECN is 
to facilitate and enhance ethical reflection in all aspects of decision making 
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educational resources to ethics committees serving health care institutions in 
the state of Maryland. The Network works to achieve this goal by:
   • Serving as a resource to ethics committees as they investigate  
 ethical dilemmas within their institution and as they strive to assist  
 their institution to act consistently with its mission statement;
   • Fostering communication and information sharing among Network  
      members;
   • Providing educational programs for ethics committee members, other 
      healthcare providers, and members of the general public on ethical  
 issues in health care; and
   • Conducting research to improve the functioning of ethics committees 
 and ultimately the care of patients in Maryland.
pain medication will cause death 
(emphases added).
These same themes are repeated 
throughout the literature on moral 
distress. In 1981, Davis reported on a 
variety of contexts in which ethical di-
lemmas were identified by nurses—the 
most frequent of which was “prolong-
ing life with heroic measures” (Davis, 
1981). Wilkinson’s study in 1988 sug-
gests the same finding, citing the high-
est occurrence of moral distress among 
nursing staff was related to prolong-
ing life and performing unnecessary 
tests and treatments on terminally 
ill patients (Wilkinson, 1987/1988). 
Follow-up surveys by both Corley and 
Omery, et al. continued to confirm 
these findings through the 1990s, cit-
ing specific issues concerning quality 
of life, do-not-resuscitate decisions, 
conflicts over what is in a patient’s 
best interest, and dying with dignity 
(Corley, 1995; Corley, et al., 2005; 
Omery, et al., 1995). Finally, Delgado 
et al.’s study in 2005 on the moral 
distress in attending physicians and 
nurses in adult ICU settings found that 
Moral Distress 
Cont. from page 1
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nurse (or other health care provider) 
to act on the patient’s behalf when not 
doing so would jeopardize his or her 
professional integrity, and the potential 
lack of clarity and decisiveness on the 
part of the nurse regarding his or her 
concrete ethical obligations (Bennett, 
2006).
Use of these terms as solely situated 
within the definitional purview of the 
nurse seems to suggest an objectiv-
ity to terms like “in the patient’s best 
interests” that simply does not ex-
ist. This is not to say that health care 
providers should not question whether 
the clinical goals articulated by the 
patient (or by extension his/her sur-
rogate) are reasonable and/or can be 
realistically achieved based on what 
is clinically appropriate. Rather, the 
process of evaluating what a patient 
would want or what is truly in the 
patient’s best interests often involves 
subjective assessments about quality 
of life, beliefs, and values that pa-
tients, surrogate decision-makers, and 
health care providers may not share. In 
those instances (e.g., following a sur-
rogate decision-maker’s wishes to con-
tinue life support for a dying patient), 
health care providers must recognize 
when moral subjectivity exists, and 
be helped to work through that moral 
terrain without misattributing their 
response to “moral distress.”
Conclusions
When examining the precise nature 
of the term moral distress, the exam-
ples identified in the literature revealed 
instances when there may not have 
been consensus about the "right thing" 
to do, and the distress caused by this 
moral subjectivity was misattributed 
to “moral distress.” Ethics consultants 
called in to address such concerns 
need to help members of the health 
care team recognize that subjective 
assessments of “right” and “wrong” 
actions need to take into account the 
patient’s perspective. Without the abil-
ity to ascertain how the patient him/
herself defined what is characterized 
as the cause of moral distress for the 
health care provider, it is difficult to 
assess whether there are truly instan-
ces when “…one knows the right thing 
to do, but institutional constraints 
make it nearly impossible to pursue 
the right course of action.” Rather, 
it may very well be the case that the 
lack of precision in understanding the 
moral locus of these subjectively  
value-laden terms leads to distress. I 
suggest this is not “moral distress” as 
defined by Jameton, but rather a dis-
comfort with moral subjectivity. 
A re-evaluation of the literature on 
moral distress may therefore be war-
ranted. A re-evaluation must clearly 
distinguish between those situations 
that are properly characterized as 
moral distress (e.g., a patient is in 
pain and the nurse is prohibited from 
administering pain medication for no 
good reason) and those that reveal a 
health care provider’s difficulty with 
moral subjectivity (e.g., a nurse dis-
agrees with a surrogate’s decision to 
prolong a dying patient’s life based on 
the surrogate’s assessment of what the 
patient would have wanted). Ultimate-
ly, a more precise characterization of 
moral distress should be sought—that 
is, a characterization of moral distress 
that does not smuggle into the concept 
itself anger or frustration with end-of-
life decision-making that is not rightly 




Columbia St. Mary's Health System
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
The above article was adapted by the 
author, with permission, from the fol-
lowing published article: Repenshek, 
M (2009). Moral Distress: Inability to 
Act or Discomfort with Moral Subjec-
tivity? Nurs Ethics 2009 16: 734-742
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MOLST IN MARYLAND
Physicians Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment (POLST) programs currently exist in 
seven states, and are being developed 
in several more states across the 
country. These programs allow 
persons—particularly those who are 
seriously ill—to make their wishes 
known regarding life-sustaining 
treatments, and to have those wishes 
communicated and honored across all 
health care settings. A POLST form 
differs from an advance directive, 
such as a living will, in that it reflects 
actual orders, rather than preferences 
that inform a clinician’s orders 
regarding life-sustaining treatments. 
The primary advantage of a POLST 
form is that it contains portable orders 
that travel with the patient across the 
continuum of care among various 
health care providers. Recent studies 
show that a patient’s wishes regarding 
end-of-life care are carried out more 
reliably when a POLST form has 
been completed. 
The Maryland version of the form 
is called MOLST—Medical Orders 
for Life-Sustaining Treatment—
because nurse practitioners can write 
such orders in Maryland. In the 
2011 Maryland legislative session, a 
bill will be introduced to recognize 
the MOLST form as a medical 
order form containing a patient’s 
preferences for treatment based on 
the patient’s current conditions and 
wishes. The MOLST form would be 
honored in all health care settings, 
regardless of whether the health care 
provider had admitting privileges 
at a particular health care facility. It 
would replace the Maryland Institute 
for Emergency Medical Services 
Systems (MIEMSS) MIEMSS/DNR 
order form and the Current Life-
Sustaining Treatment (LST) Options 
form.
The MOLST form first requires the 
practitioner to explain the authority 
for issuing it (for 
example, based on 
the consent of the 
patient). The next 
section records the 
code status for the 
patient (i.e., whether 
cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation [CPR] 
should be attempted 
on scene or when 
emergency medical 
services personnel are summoned). 
Originally, a “do not resuscitate” 
(EMS/DNR) order allowed only for 
palliative care. MIEMSS then revised 
the EMS/DNR order to provide for 
an aggressive option that allows for 
other advanced treatments prior to 
arrest (Option A) and another option 
for more passive treatments prior 
to arrest (Option B). In practice, 
MIEMSS discovered that patients 
with reversible conditions have 
been selecting the passive Option 
B rather than the more aggressive 
Option A because they did not 
want intubation. Thus, MIEMSS 
has deleted intubation as one of the 
permitted treatments in Option A, 
creating the current EMS/DNR A 
(Do Not Intubate—DNI) option. The 
“old” EMS/DNR Option A (with 
intubation) forms that have been 
signed will still be honored by EMS 
providers.
The second page of the MOLST 
form contains orders regarding 
life-sustaining treatments, including 
artificial ventilation, blood 
transfusion, hospital transfer, medical 
workup, antibiotics, artificially 
administered fluids and nutrition, 
and kidney dialysis. The intent of 
the MOLST form is to generate 
consolidated orders that relate 
to current treatment issues and 
preferences. Periodic review of the 
form is thus vitally important when 
the patient’s condition substantially 
changes, the patient is transferred or 
discharged, the patient loses capacity 
to make health care decisions, or 
the patient changes his or her mind 
regarding treatments. These events 
would trigger further review of the 
MOLST form.     
The MOLST form must be kept 
in the patient’s medical record and 
transferred with the patient. Only 
those parts of the MOLST form that 
relate to a patient’s current treatment 
condition or preferences would need 
to be completed. Proper use of the 
form would require a large, ongoing 
educational effort. Toward this end, 
Dr. Steven Levenson has authored 
a guide on how to use the MOLST 
form. The plan is to educate all 
health care providers once the bill 
is passed by providing train-the-
trainer sessions, followed by training 
conducted by health care provider 
organizations.  
The MOLST form was developed 
under the auspices of a Maryland 
Governor’s Council for End of 
Life Care working group led by Dr. 
Levenson. Other working group 
members include Assistant Attorney 
General Paul Ballard, Dr. Tricia 
Nay, Bill Vaughan from the Office 
of Health Care Quality, Dr. Richard 
Alcorta, and Assistant Attorney 
General Sarah Sette from MIEMSS.
The draft MOLST form, draft 
guide, and draft bill are posted on the 
OHCQ website, at http://www.dhmh.
state.md.us/ohcq/. 
The MOLST form would replace the current 
MIEMSS/DNR order form and the Life-Sustaining 
Treatment (LST) Options form (formerly called the 
“Patient’s Plan of Care” form). It meets criteria set 
forth in the POLST Paradigm. 
Visit http://www.ohsu.edu/polst/ for more information 
about the POLST Paradigm. 
Visit http://www.dhmh.state.md.us/ohcq/ for more 
information about the Maryland MOLST form.
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THE PHILOSOPHER'S CORNER: 
THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE EFFECT
The principle of double effect was developed by Roman Catholic moral theologians 
in the Middle Ages. It is applied to 
situations in which it is impossible to 
avoid all harmful action and a deci-
sion must be made about whether 
one potentially harmful action is 
preferable to another (Quill, Dresser, 
& Brock, 1997). It is used to justify 
claims that the results of an act that 
would be morally wrong if it were 
caused intentionally are permissible 
if the “bad results” were unintended. 
The principle is often cited to explain 
why certain interventions at the end 
of life that hasten death are morally 
permissible and others are not. The 
traditional formulation of this prin-
ciple stipulates that the following four 
conditions must be met before an act 
with both good and bad (i.e., “evil”) 
consequences may be morally justi-
fied:
1. The action itself must be good 
or at least morally indifferent;
2. The individual must sincerely 
intend only the good effect and 
not the bad;
3. The bad effect cannot be the 
means to the good effect; and
4. There must be a proportionately 
good reason for permitting the 
bad effect; that is, there must be 
a favorable balance between the 
good and the bad effects of the 
action.
The first condition determines 
whether the potential action is ever 
permissible, while the second and 
third conditions are used to deter-
mine whether the potential harm is 
intentional or unintentional, either 
as a means or as an end in itself. The 
fourth condition requires the agent to 
compare the net good and bad ef-
fects of the potential act to determine 
which course produces an effect of 
proportionally greater good (Quill, et 
al., 1997).
Health care providers may appeal 
to this principle in morally difficult 
situations where it is not possible to 
benefit a patient by an action with-
out at the same time causing harm. 
The classic example is that of the 
terminally ill dying patient who is 
experiencing both great pain and a 
low respiratory rate. The treatment of 
choice, morphine sulfate, will allevi-
ate the pain but might also cause re-
spiratory suppression. The clinician’s 
moral duty to alleviate pain appears 
to conflict with the duty to protect 
and preserve life. An argument that 
the clinician is justified in adminis-
tering morphine, even if it hastens 
the patient’s death, is based on the 
following tenets of the principle of 
double effect: 
1. The action of giving morphine 
is itself morally indifferent.
2. The intended effect is to relieve 
the pain, not to suppress the 
respirations.
3. Respiratory suppression is not 
the means by which the pain 
relief is obtained.
4. The relief of pain and the 
related reduction of suffering 
combine to provide a sufficient-
ly important reason, or propor-
tionately greater good than the 
harm that is incurred—respira-
tory depression and hastened 
death (Schwarz, 2004).
There are some who question the 
clinical usefulness of this principle 
as a guide to ethical decision making 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2008). In 
particular, some clinical experts in 
palliative care challenge the pur-
ported “double effect” of opiate use 
in terminally ill patients, and describe 
the likelihood of a secondarily as-
sociated hastened death as an “over 
blown myth” (Manfredi, Morrison, & 
Meier, 1998). Indeed, some studies 
have shown that opioids do not hasten 
death in terminally ill patients, partic-
ularly in patients who are not opioid 
naïve, due to acquisition of tolerance 
to an opioid’s respiratory depres-
sant effects (Bakker, Jansen, Lima 
& Kompanje, 2008; Portenoy et al., 
2006). Others caution that “using the 
[principle of double effect] to justify 
using opioids to treat pain in dying 
patients contributes to the belief in 
the double effect of pain medication, 
which in turn leads to fear of hasten-
ing death and the undertreatment of 
pain” (Fohr, 1998, p. 316).
Experienced palliative care 
practitioners recognize that death 
sometimes occurs secondarily as 
an unintended though foreseen side 
effect of opioids used to manage 
certain refractory symptoms in dying 
patients, particularly opioid-naïve 
patients (e.g., in terminal ventilator 
weaning). Despite the clear legal and 
moral consensus supporting the ap-
propriateness of such interventions, 
when a patient dies soon after receiv-
ing a dose of opioid, it can be upset-
ting to the person who administered 
that last dose. The fear of hastening 
death has been identified as a primary 
reason why nurses may be reluctant 
to provide adequate pain relief to suf-
fering patients (Solomon et al., 1993).
Another concern among critics of 
applying this principle is depiction of 
death as being an “evil” to be avoid-
ed. When careful titration of medica-
tion can relieve symptoms without 
hastening death, it is not ethically jus-
tifiable to forego titration and hasten 
death. However, not all patients who 
are dying view death as an evil to be 
avoided.  Magnusson (2006, p. 567) 
Cont. on page 6
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Double Effect 
Cont. from page 5
suggests an alternative to the principle 
of double effect, as summarized here:
In circumstances where the provi-
sion of symptom relief is highly 
likely or indeed certain to shorten 
a patient’s life, it is appropriate to 
impute to the physician an inten-
tion to hasten death. This does 
not mean that law or medical 
ethics is committed to acknowl-
edging euthanasia as a routine 
part of palliative care: it is the 
surreptitious, undeclared practice 
of euthanasia that justifies the 
critique of conventional accounts 
of palliative care. It is, however, 
to recognize that physicians must 
sometimes face the devil’s choice: 
a choice, that is, between relieving 
suffering and hastening death in 
circumstances where there is no 
third alternative and where it is 
not possible not to choose.
The commonality to both of these 
methods of justifying hastening death 
to alleviate suffering is that measures 
to alleviate suffering are proportionate 
(i.e., palliative medications are titrated 
to relieve symptoms), and that there is 
no other alternative available.
The above article was adapted from 
the book chapter: Tarzian, AJ & 
Schwarz, JK (2010). Ethical Aspects 
of Palliative Care. In M Matzo & D 
Sherman’s Palliative Care NursiNg: 
Quality Care to the eNd of life. New 
York: Springer.
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ERRATUM
In the Summer, 2010 issue of the Newsletter, in the article “Patients without Proxies—What’s Happening in Other 
States?”, we mistakenly referred to University Hospitals Case Medical Center in Cleveland, Ohio as “Case West-
ern Reserve Hospital.” Our apologies to Cynthia Griggins, PhD, MA, Co-Director of the Clinical Ethics Service at 
University Hospitals Case Medical Center and UHCMC staff for this error.
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CASE PRESENTATION
One of the regular features of this Newsletter is the presentation 
of a case considered by an ethics 
committee and an analysis of the 
ethical issues involved. Readers are 
both encouraged to comment on the 
case or analysis and to submit other 
cases that their ethics committee has 
dealt with. In all cases, identifying 
information about patients and others 
in the case should only be provided 
with the permission of the patient. 
Unless otherwise indicated, our policy 
is not to identify the submitter or 
institution. We may also change facts 
to protect confidentiality. Cases and 
comments should be sent to MHECN@
law.umaryland.edu, or MHECN, Law 
& Health Care Program, University 
of Maryland School of Law, 500 W. 
Baltimore St., Baltimore, MD 21201.
CASE FROM A NICU
Baby Boy Smith is a 2400 gram male infant born at 34 weeks gestation at a small community 
hospital. His mother is 33 years old, 
with three other children. Her preg-
nancy was unremarkable, although 
she had late prenatal care. The mom 
reported having a normal prenatal 
ultrasound at approximately 20 weeks. 
When she presented in pre-term labor, 
oligohydramnios (low amniotic fluid) 
was noted on ultrasound. The infant 
was delivered vaginally, and required 
intubation in the delivery room due 
to poor respiratory effort. Multiple 
anomalies including bilateral cleft 
lip and palate, micropthalmia (small 
eyes), talipes equinovarus (club foot), 
microcephaly (small head circumfer-
ence) and ruptured omphalocele (intes-
tines protruding through belly button) 
were noted at delivery. The infant was 
transferred to a tertiary care NICU. An 
echocardiogram following admission 
revealed large atrial and ventricular 
septal defects (heart abnormalities). 
A head ultrasound was reported as 
normal. On the day of admission, he 
was brought to the operating room for 
primary repair of the omphalocele. He 
remained intubated postoperatively, 
and became critically ill with pulmo-
nary hypertension. Rapid FISH testing 
confirmed suspected Trisomy 13, a 
genetic disorder in which a person has 
three copies of genetic material from 
chromosome 13, instead of the usual 
two copies. 
Following surgery and FISH results, 
the parents met with the neonatologist, 
geneticist, and pediatric cardiologist 
to discuss the baby’s diagnosis and 
prognosis and to develop plans for his 
care. Recommendations for pallia-
tive care were made to the family, and 
withdrawal of life support was offered. 
The parents, in particular the baby’s 
father, expressed mistrust in the medi-
cal system based on past experiences. 
The parents discussed strong spiritual 
beliefs that their baby’s future was in 
the hands of God, whose work was 
being done by the medical team. The 
parents expressed understanding that 
their baby should be comfortable and 
without pain, but felt that life support 
should be continued and escalated as 
needed to keep their son alive. The 
parents’ review of information and 
case reports on the internet promised 
hope for a future quality of life for 
their son that was different from what 
the medical team described. The par-
ents also expressed concern that there 
was insufficient medical support near 
their small town home to adequately 
care for their son there. They preferred 
hospitalization in the NICU for their 
son until he required minimal support 
and care. 
The baby’s cardiorespiratory status 
improved over the first 48 hours of life 
with high frequency ventilation and 
nitric oxide, and he was weaned to 
minimal ventilator support. Over the 
next two months, he failed multiple 
attempts at extubation due to sig-
nificant oropharyngeal secretions and 
worsening respiratory distress when 
off the ventilator. He remained orally 
intubated on the ventilator, on minimal 
settings. He developed evidence of 
pituitary dysfunction with hypoglyce-
mia, metabolic acidosis, and electro-
lyte instability requiring intravenous 
(IV) nutrition and fluids in addition to 
enteral feedings to maintain normal 
fluid and electrolyte balance. Weight 
gain was slow but consistent, with no 
increase in head circumference from 
birth to 2 months of life. He was main-
tained on oral morphine for sedation 
and pain control. 
There were multiple family meet-
ings following the time of diagnosis. 
The parents maintained their posi-
tion that the medical team should 
proceed with all life extending care, 
and their visits became less frequent. 
The medical team discussed, but did 
not recommend, a tracheostomy and 
gastrostomy tube placement as a next 
step in the care of infants with this 
degree of illness. The parents declined 
tracheostomy and gastrostomy place-
ment. They stated on several occa-
sions that further invasive procedures 
were not in the best interest of their 
child, but they consistently rejected an 
end-of-life palliative care approach. 
The father was at times angry both at 
the bedside and in family meetings, 
and vocalized his desire to avoid any 
further conversations about palliative 
care, a DNR order, and non-escala-
tion of treatment. The medical team 
became increasingly uncomfortable 
giving what they considered to be 
medically inappropriate therapy, given 
the diagnosis of Trisomy 13 and the 
patient’s hospital course during the 
first few months of life. The medical 
team felt that escalation of treatment 
and surgical procedures to prolong life 
such as tracheostomy were not in the 
best interest of the patient and, at this 
point, would only prolong pain and 
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suffering. They questioned the par-
ents’ ability to make decisions in the 
best interest of their child. An ethics 
consultation was requested to consider 
whether CPR could be withheld or the 
ventilator withdrawn based on medical 
ineffectiveness criteria.
COMMENTS FROM  
A NEONATOLOGIST & 
ETHICS COMMITTEE 
MEMBER
Anticipating the birth of a baby is often a wonderful event for families. Baby gift registries, 
painting the nursery, choosing daycare 
providers, planning dates for maternity 
leave, all events of joyful preparation 
for a beautiful, healthy infant. Few 
families have life experiences that 
prepare them for the possibility that 
their infant could be born with a life-
threatening illness or could die before 
ever leaving the hospital.  In this case, 
the Smith family experienced an un-
eventful pregnancy and their prenatal 
testing was reassuring.  There was no 
warning that anything might be wrong. 
When labor occurs prematurely, par-
ents are particularly discombobulated, 
with urgent juggling of jobs, childcare, 
and finances.
It is no surprise that parents are 
completely blindsided when their baby 
is born with serious medical problems. 
It is, in fact, predictable.   On the other 
hand, obstetrical and neonatal teams 
are prepared for such unexpected 
tragedies and have a duty to anticipate 
the emotional, psychological, spiritual 
and social needs of families in these 
scenarios.  Services that should be 
available include personnel trained in 
how to appropriately deliver bad news, 
interdisciplinary teams who can imme-
diately address families’ needs beyond 
medical information, and anticipatory 
guidance for families so that they can 
brace themselves for this crisis. 
Ethically complex decisions oc-
Case Presentation 
Cont. from page 7
curred in this case from the moment 
of birth, long before the issue of a 
trachesotomy was raised or an Ethics 
Consultation requested.   The Smith 
family—and the obstetricians—had no 
warning that the newborn would have 
a life-threatening condition.   He was 
urgently transferred to a regional hos-
pital, a transfer that separates infants 
from their parents and often involves 
hours of commuting for the fam-
ily.  Whether to transfer a baby with 
suspected Trisomy 13 to a regional 
hospital may arguably not be in the 
best interest of the infant or family.  
Palliative care from the moment of 
birth would be another option.  Parent 
surprise about the infant’s condition 
and community physician discom-
fort with making complex diagnoses 
or limiting interventions often pre-
vent early consideration of palliative 
care. This may have led to Baby boy 
Smith’s transport in this case.  
The neonatologists at the regional 
hospital  seem also to have been 
taken by surprise by the diagnosis of 
Trisomy 13, a condition which has a 
median survival time of 7-10 days and 
a 95% mortality in infancy (Rasmus-
sen SA Peds 2003).  Gastroschisis 
repair was completed on the first day 
of life, presumably prior to confirming 
the important diagnosis of the life-lim-
iting syndrome, and likely when the 
mother was still an inpatient at another 
hospital.   We do not know if the deci-
sion to perform gastroschisis repair—a 
procedure which is often not emer-
gent—was weighed against the option 
to provide comfort care only for this 
infant with a severe genetic syndrome.  
We do know that the medical team did 
not request an Ethics Consultation at 
that time.
Neither the decision for neonatal 
transport nor the decision for gastros-
chisis repair may have been presented 
to the family as ethically complex 
options.  Physicians are profession-
ally obligated to provide medical 
treatment to newborns when diag-
nostic and prognostic uncertainty is 
very high, as it may have been in the 
first days of this case.  But they feel 
similarly ethically obligated to delay 
non-emergent surgeries when a severe, 
life-limiting genetic syndrome is part 
of the differential diagnosis.   When 
this kind of thoughtful analysis and 
clear communication with the family 
does not occur, the family often finds 
it difficult to reconcile with the medi-
cal team’s threshold between “doing 
for” and “doing to.”  Parent mistrust of 
physicians, identified as an important 
barrier in this case, is only enhanced 
when physicians initiate a complex 
treatment course and then quickly ask 
parents’ permission to abandon it.
That parents find comfort and hope 
in their religious beliefs is common 
during their child’s critical illness 
(Boss, 2008; Robinson, 2006). The 
family in this case indicated that 
they believed their baby’s care was 
in God’s hands; it is unclear how the 
medical team explored the sources and 
boundaries of this belief, or whether 
a chaplain was called to navigate 
physician-family conversations about 
suffering, hope, and quality of life.  A 
time-limited trial of intensive care, 
with a plan to allow natural death to 
occur barring substantial improve-
ment, can be acceptable to some fami-
lies with similar belief systems.
The medical team experienced moral 
distress in their care of the Smith fam-
ily, particularly when it seemed that 
this family who “wanted everything 
done” for their son, did not want him 
to come home. Apparently both the 
parents and the medical team agreed 
that a tracheostomy and g-tube were 
not in the infant’s best interest, and 
the medical team should feel good 
about their ability to align these goals.   
The conflict revolves around how the 
infant is going to die: the medical team 
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wishes to withdraw life support now, 
and the parents want the infant to con-
tinue to live in the NICU indefinitely.  
Staff moral distress, which often pre-
cipitates Ethics Consultation, requires 
direct acknowledgment and interven-
tion by leadership.  It appears that 
in this case, moral distress was only 
aggravated by physicians who offered 
CPR to the parents.   Limiting painful 
procedures, maximizing treatment of 
pain and agitation, helping to engage 
the family during their visits in the 
NICU, and a plan to forgo medically 
ineffective surgeries, reintubations, or 
CPR attempts, is an ethically defen-
sible path.  This could promote infant 
quality of life, offer more time for the 
family to bond and grieve, and could 
diminish staff distress.  
That this case is presented with ex-
tensive information about the family’s 
goals and motivations—but minimal 
information about the medical team’s 
personalities or motivations—serves 
as a reminder that such “difficult” 
cases are often viewed as isolated 
problems with particular families.   
Many of these “difficult” issues are 
predictable system problems that occur 
when communication and navigation 
of ethically complex cases is not rou-
tinely emphasized in medical training, 
maintenance of board certification, or 
career advancement. Ethics consulta-
tions are generally called when pro-
longed clinical scenarios have reached 
a crisis of communication breakdown 
and dysfunction.  The meaningful im-
pact that such crisis consultations can 
have on family outcomes and future 
physician decision-making in similar 
scenarios is unclear.   
Renee Boss, M.D., M.H.S.
Assistant Professor, 
Division of Neonatology
Johns Hopkins School of Medicine
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COMMENTS FROM  
A NURSE ETHICIST
Parents think about their responsibilities as parents which includes not just caring for and 
about their new baby, but also a duty 
to support him and do what is best for 
him.  In the NICU, parents are forced 
to share their parenting responsibilities 
with members of the health care 
team.  The lack of trust between the 
parents and the medical team is in 
many ways the central issue of this 
case.  Without trust, parents will not 
believe the team respects them and 
may not believe what the team says, 
as is evident by these parents’ hopes 
for a better future based on what they 
have read on the internet.  The parents 
have acknowledged limits to the 
interventions they feel their son should 
endure, namely the tracheostomy and 
gastrostomy tube.  When the team 
questions the parents’ ability to make 
decisions in the best interests of their 
son, it is evidence that the team does 
not trust the parents any more than the 
parents trust them.  
When they trust health care 
providers, parents are more able to 
accept information from them.  Parents 
interpret one meaning about the baby's 
condition based on what they see, and 
that meaning in this case seems to be 
contradicted by the information from 
providers, which represents a different 
interpretation of the baby’s condition.  
Parents struggle with their hopes for 
a better future for their son and the 
reality of his condition in the NICU.  
In a sense, there is a reality they want 
juxtaposed against a reality the health 
care team believes they must accept.  
In fact, the parents were given a grim 
prognosis early on in this little boy’s 
life, and yet thanks to technology 
and the good work of the health care 
team, he is still alive two months later.  
Why would any caring parent give 
permission to stop treatment when 
clearly it has allowed their son to live?
While physicians who believe a 
treatment is ineffective may have 
the legal authority in Maryland to 
withhold procedures, including CPR, 
in this case, such an approach would 
reinforce the parents’ perceptions that 
physicians cannot be trusted.  Yet 
the mounting moral distress of the 
professional caregivers cannot be 
ignored.  Not only do physicians and 
nurses in particular have to witness 
the suffering of this infant, they bear 
the burden of providing on-going 
care.  Routine medical care for this 
infant involves daily interventions 
that are painful and uncomfortable 
with no real expectation that those 
interventions will change the outcome 
for this infant, namely that he cannot 
live outside the ICU and his complex 
constellation of anomalies virtually 
guarantees that he will die before 
ever being stable enough to return to 
a neonatal unit closer to where the 
parents live, let alone for them to care 
for him at home.  
The central dilemma in this case is 
how to reconcile the reality that the 
parents have mutually inconsistent 
goals – they wish their son to live yet 
believe placement of a tracheostomy 
is not in his best interests, and yet in 
order for him to live he needs a more 
stable airway.  Forcing the parents 
to consider a DNR approach, or 
comfort care only, in the absence of 
any success at getting them to trust 
the team perpetuates the illusion that 
the parents have a choice, when in 
reality their choice is ultimately not 
about continuing treatment, but about 
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planning for how they want their son 
to die.  Constantly asking parents to 
consider a choice where no real choice 
exists would be confusing for anyone, 
let alone parents who do not trust you.  
Parents need to believe that 
physicians present options of limiting 
treatment because they are sincere and 
compassionate, basically that they care 
about the baby and the baby’s family.  
Anger and frustration on the part of 
the health care team do not convey 
caring.  Demonstrations of grief or 
sadness on the part of providers could 
send a powerful message to parents, 
namely, that the doctors and nurses 
genuinely care about their son.  Trust 
inspired by a caring context will 
promote these parents’ confidence 
in the information and the plan for 
the baby.  Rather than ask repeatedly 
about DNR and referring to the plan 
as end of life care, a more useful 
approach might be to not ask explicitly 
for their permission but lay out a plan 
for extubation and no reintubation. 
Rather than DNR, health care 
providers should discuss why 
extubation to CPAP, for instance, 
is a step toward one of their stated 
goals (i.e., getting him closer to 
home) and then discuss why putting 
the endotracheal tube back is not 
consistent with the overall goal for 
him.  Instead of talking about what 
will not be done, focus on what will be 
done.  Constantly offering the parents 
a choice or seeking their permission 
implies a choice when in this case 
there is no real choice about saving 
this little boy’s life.
It is ethically defensible to extubate 
with a plan not to re-intubate.  It is 
based on the burden of intubation and 
the standards of care for neonates.  
Refusal of a tracheostomy means the 
parents are in effect saying if he needs 
a tracheostomy to live, the burden is 
too great.  For health care providers 
Case Presentation 
Cont. from page 9
to keep hammering away and asking 
them to agree to a DNR order puts an 
unnecessary burden on the parents. 
They are making their wishes clear 
and it is up to the health care team to 
support them and explain what their 
choice means.  The biggest challenge 
is to give parents the feeling of 
control, of the sense of their making a 
parental decision without asking them 
to make a medical decision about the 
efficacy of any given treatment.  
Language is crucial.  If the baby has 
respiratory distress after extubation 
(do not say “fails extubation”) then the 
team will provide comfort measures 
to ease the discomfort and work of 
breathing.  The baby will continue to 
receive care and attention from the 
doctors and nurses, but addressing 
any respiratory distress cannot include 
replacing the endotracheal tube.  
Rather than say the team will not 
resuscitate the baby, the team should 
emphasize that if the baby deteriorates, 
they will allow a natural death.  
It is crucial in this case, if possible, 
to avoid a resuscitation scene.  To 
make a plan with the parents to be 
present for extubation with family 
and staff there to support them and 
reassure them that their son will be 
comfortable and that the team will be 
there to care for their son, but not to 
put him back on the ventilator.  If the 
baby deteriorates to the point where 
he meets the criteria for resuscitation, 
physicians may and in this case 
they have an obligation to exercise 
their clinical judgment and stop a 
resuscitation when they feel it is not 
achieving the goal.  The team in this 
case should not have to “prove” a 
resuscitation will not work.  One of 
the challenges in this case is to prepare 
the nurses for what to do when the 
patient meets criteria for CPR.  That 
is a challenge because in the neonatal 
setting, expert practitioners are trained 
to intervene to prevent the code from 
happening and in effect begin an ICU 
resuscitation before the dramatic, TV-
style resuscitation is needed.
Members of the health care team 
need assistance from ethics and 
palliative care to reframe their 
thinking about actions.  To be a good 
ICU nurse or physician means to 
prevent the need for resuscitation.  In 
this case, to be a good ICU nurse and 
physician may be to allow the baby’s 
condition to deteriorate to where he 
meets resuscitation criteria and then 
gently, carefully and skillfully support 
him without intervening to stop nature 
from taking its course.
Ethicists debate appropriate theories 
and models to use to resolve ethical 
dilemmas such as the ones faced by 
the parents and health care providers 
in this case.  Parents do not identify 
ethical theories or models that are 
helpful to them as they struggle to 
make meaningful choices in the face 
of uncertainty, suffering and loss. The 
parents in this case do not need help 
with decision making.  They need help 
feeling they are good parents even as 
their baby dies in the NICU.  They 
deserve respect as parents.
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CALENDAR OF EVENTS
JANUARY
11 (12-1:30 PM) Tony Black, MD, Sheila Hutzler-Rives Memorial Lecture, Berman Institute of Bioeth-
ics Seminar Series, 615 N. Wolfe St., Baltimore, MD, W3008. For more information, visit http://www.
bioethicsinstitute.org/.
11  (12-1:30 PM) David Brendel, MD, PhD, “ScattergoodEthics Program” lunch presentation. Penn Center 
for Bioethics, 3401 Market Street, Room 321, Philadelphia, PA. RSVP to: spaebh@mail.med.upenn.
edu. Call 215-898-7136 for more information. Also visit http://www.scattergoodethics.org/.
14  (8:15 PM) The Value of Life, lecture by Mr. S. Ramachandran, St. John’s College, Francis Scott Key 
Auditorium, Annapolis, MD. For more information, call 410-626-2539.
21 (8:15 PM) Wealth, Virtue and Corruption: Adam Smith's Moral Philosophy, lecture by Mr. Lauren 
Brubaker. St. John’s College, Francis Scott Key Auditorium, Annapolis, MD. For more information, 
call 410-626-2539.
FEBRUARY
10  (5-7 PM) “Health Care Disparities and Health Care Reform,” Professor Emeritus Frank McClellan 
from Temple University Beasley School of Law. Part of the Health Law Reform Speaker Series at the 
University of Maryland School of Law, 500 W. Baltimore St., Ceremonial Court Room (160E). Talk 
followed by reception. Contact: Virginia Rowthorn (vrowthorn@law.umaryland.edu).
14 (12-1:30 PM) Jeffrey Kahn, PhD, MPH, Berman Institute of Bioethics Seminar Series, 615 N. Wolfe 
St., Baltimore, MD, W3008. For more information, visit http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/.
28 Managing Electronic Communications in Professional Practice: Emerging Ethical Challenges and Risk- 
Management Implications. Workshop presenter Frederic Reamer, Ph.D. Rhode Island College School 
of Social Work, Mt. Washington Conference Center, 5801 Smith Ave., Suite 1100, Baltimore, MD. For  
questions, contact Linda Friend at 443-923-2802.
Feb. 28-
Mar.1 The Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues meeting (open to the public). For infor-
mation on location, webcast, and to obtain transcripts, visit http://www.bioethics.gov/meetings/.
MARCH
5 Valuing Lives, a one-day conference in New York, NY. Contact Ben Sachs for more information:  
sachs@nyu.edu, 212-992-8686.
18-20  Bioethics—More Personal or More Global? National Undergraduate Bioethics Conference at Duke 
University, Durham, North Carolina.
31 (5-7 PM) “Health Care and Cost Containment.” Health Law Reform Speaker Series at the University of 
Maryland School of Law, 500 W. Baltimore St., Ceremonial Court Room (160E). Talk followed by  
reception. Contact: Virginia Rowthorn (vrowthorn@law.umaryland.edu).
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